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Public Sector Organizational Failure: A study of collective denial in the UK  
National Health Service 
Abstract  
This paper argues that public sector organizational failure may be best understood 
from a perspective of collective denial. The rise of this phenomenon is examined 
using testimony from a Public Inquiry into the downfall of a UK hospital, where 
falling organizational standards led to unethical decision making and an unacceptable 
number of patient deaths. In this paper we show how collective denial, over time, 
became a process that resided within the fabric of organizational life.  To explore the 
organizational processes associated with collective denial, and how and why it occurs, 
we identify the influence of a ‘narrative of silence’. This narrative allows ever more 
serious failings to be justified as organizational members lose contact with reality 
entering a downward spiral with no recovery.  The combined impact of assumptions 
about leadership capability, enculturated professional identities and organizational 
loyalty create an environment where a narrative of silence can develop.       
Keywords: Public sector, Organizational Failure, Denial, Collective Denial, Silence, 
Narrative, Hubris, UK NHS 
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Public Sector Organizational Failure: A study of collective denial in the UK 
National Health Service 
Organizational scandals where it seems that everyone became trapped in a 
catastrophic cycle of failure expose how public sector failure can remain hidden for a 
long time (Jas and Skelcher, 2005; Meier and Bohte, 2003); cloaked in professional 
socialization, misconduct is modified into acceptable practice (Dixon-Woods et al, 
2011; Gabbioneta et al, 2019; Mannion et al 2019). The perpetual downward 
trajectory becomes enculturated so that those involved are surprised when the scandal 
engages national and international scrutiny (Hutchinson, 2016). 
In this paper we argue that public sector organizational failure may best be 
understood from a perspective of ‘collective denial’: a concept referring to a shared 
process of coping with organizational failings, where almost everyone turns a blind 
eye, and where professional misconduct is justified or ignored. Our theorizing of the 
collective denial of failure was inspired by an empirical case study set within the UK 
public sector, the downfall of Mid Staffordshire National Health Service (NHS) 
Hospital Trust (see Francis, 2013). Failures in healthcare face exceptional scrutiny 
and local transgressions can quickly attract national (or international) attention. 
Scandal narratives which diminish trust in the medical profession or depict nurses as 
uncaring, capture public and political interest (Hutchison, 2016; Mannion et al 2019).  
The public inquiry into the downfall (and later dismantling) of the Trust 
(Francis, 2013) largely fails to explore why the apparently common toxic culture 
(Pope, 2017) was never corrected, but escalated until implosion. Failure to identify 
and react to early signals of wrongdoing can allow organizational failure to remain 
hidden, and a toxic culture becomes difficult to remedy (Anheier, 1999; Balch and 
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Armstrong, 2010; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2003, 2015). We know little about how failure 
develops and becomes normalized at an organizational level, but collective denial 
examines the impact of interactions between all organizational members, and 
therefore helps us to understand misconduct perpetuated by many employees 
simultaneously.  
In understanding the dynamic processes that led to shared denial we draw on a 
‘narrative of silence’. Here, narratives are the pivotal process, by which collective 
denial is upheld and sustained. Narratives are a useful motivational framework 
because they can control organizational expressions of concerns and produce 
organizational inertia (Naslund and Pemer, 2011; Dailey & Browning 2014). 
Particularly, a ‘narrative of silence’ offers useful explanation about how 
organizational members unified around non-disclosure of deteriorating standards of 
care, preventing corrective courses of action from being enacted (Stouten et al 2019; 
Morrison and Milliken, 2000), and allowed the collective denial of failure to embed 
and become crystallized.    
Building on this notion we ask the following empirical questions. Why do 
actors seem unable or unwilling to stop the escalation of wrong-doing and denial? 
Why do actors become trapped into a narrative of silence? What leadership, 
professional and organizational practices contribute to the emergence and 
maintenance of collective denial? Our study argues that some organizations are more 
prone to the phenomenon of collective denial than others. We make a contribution to 
public sector change failure literature by exploring the processes and mechanisms that 
underlie continued failure. We explore how the combined impact of enculturated 
professional and organizational loyalties, and the inherently resource pressured nature 
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of the work, made speaking out so difficult (see Cannon & Edmonson 2001; 
Schlosser & Zolin 2012).  
 
Organizational failure in the Public Sector 
Failure can be defined as deviation from expected and desired events resulting 
from the actions (or lack of action) of one or more organizational agents (Cannon and 
Edmonson, 2001). A failure can result from a single major event or a cumulative 
series of incidents. It can be difficult, in the moment, to identify the severity or level 
of failure; to know the point when failure becomes an inevitable outcome that will 
lead to the collapse of the entire organization (Anheier, 1999; Cannon and Edmonson, 
2001). Work on organizational crisis examines how organizations respond to 
unpredictable events, arguing that organizations need to develop cognitive, 
behavioural, emotional and relational capabilities which increase their reliability and 
resilience, so reducing risk and improving responses to triggering events (Williams et 
al, 2017). This literature argues that unexpected errors or failings are in fact knowable 
if an organization is mindful to detecting weak signals (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2015). 
Becoming more resilient to failure may have negative consequences. For 
example, organizational members may develop overly positive self-conceptions and 
emotionally disassociate by creating positive illusions but denying acknowledgement 
of failure (Westphal & Bonanno, 2007; Williams et al, 2017). In this sense, resilience 
could lead to missing signals of failure. Reviewing literature on crisis management 
and resilience, Williams et al (2017) argue that this darker side of resilience is 
virtually unexplained and in need of further research.  
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In the public sector, organizational failure is often more accurately seen as 
sustained poor performance or poor decision making (e.g. Jas and Skelcher, 2005; 
Meier and Bohte, 2003) as opposed to measurement against financial parameters and 
profitability. There are less-well established metrics for poor performance (Walshe et 
al, 2004) and the high persistence of low performance is more common than outright 
collapse. Jas and Skelcher (2005) argue that public sector organizations experience 
performance cycles and fluctuations but commonly engage in self-initiated turnaround 
if the organization possesses sufficient leadership capability. According to their model 
of decline and turnaround in public organizations, Jas and Skelcher (2005) posit that 
if self-initiated turnaround fails, external pressure will eventually generate leadership 
capability. This can take the form of leadership succession or external measures being 
imposed on the organization from regulatory bodies. In literature on high reliability 
organizations, Weick and Sutcliffe (2015) argue a mindful approach that emphasizes 
a sensitivity to operations, resists simplification of processes, and results in 
breakdowns and errors being more obvious at earlier stages. However, reaching this 
position can take considerable time and resources (Williams et al, 2017).  Public 
sector organizations are highly susceptible to political change, policy clashes and 
conflicting objectives, which create constant flux, problems of performance 
measurement, and resource allocation (Meier and Bohte, 2003). Failure may be 
triggered by changing public needs, combined with increasing demand for services 
and increasing diversity in function and task (Andrews et al, 2006; Meier and Bohte, 
2003; Walshe et al., 2004). In a context of such change, resource pressure and 
complexity, achieving high reliability and sensitivity to failure, is challenging. 
High profile failures in healthcare and instances of professional misconduct 
attract scrutiny and lead to policy changes (Gabbioneta et al, 2019; Hutchison, 2016; 
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Mannion et al 2019), but beyond this, we argue it is important to understand the 
contextual origins and dynamics of failure because they are costly in terms of the 
material and human resources needed to put things right.  Beyond resource costs is the 
human cost. Public sector poor performance can have significant impact on the 
welfare of citizens and so failure to correct knowingly poor performing organizations 
could be considered morally questionable. 
 
Leadership, professionalism and organizational denial 
The idea of a toxic or hubristic leader, as a catalyst for failure is a growing 
theme in contemporary debates (McManus, 2018; Picone et al, 2014; Stein, 2013; 
Tourish, 2014) positioning organizational leaders as a significant contextual factor 
when considering manifestations of denial about failure (see Piconne et al 2014). The 
relationship between organizational leaders and strong professional groups (Strong 
and Robinson, 1990; Harrison et al, 1992) also presents an interesting context to study 
collective denial. UK physician groups may resist leadership attempts to control them, 
or to take on institutional responsibility, due to macro level pressures (i.e. the 
protection of professional bodies) and micro level control (over clinical decision 
making, and the use of resources) (see Harrison et al, 1992; Strong and Robinson, 
1990).  
The power of professional groups within our case study overlaps with many of 
the outcomes of groupthink (Janis, 1982). Issues such as over-confidence and 
unnecessary risk-taking are clearly observable, but unlike groupthink our analysis is 
not limited to decision-makers in small groups. We see how the organization itself 
becomes an island underpinned with denial, not necessarily around a consensus view, 
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but a shared way of behaving and interpreting the environment. Ours is not primarily 
a story of group cohesion, but of collective agency. A combination of this agency and 
collective silence binds leaders and followers in such a way that everyone becomes 
complicit. Over an expanded time-span the fates of the organizational leadership and 
professionals become intertwined (Dunn and Eble, 2015; Vadera and Pratt, 2013). 
Healthcare organizational failures such as the case of the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary scandal of 1998, where 35 children died due to the clinical incompetence of 
two cardiac surgeons (Mannion et al 2019, Weick & Sutcliffe 2003) highlight how 
strong individual leadership combined with structural hierarchies promoted an insular 
‘club culture’, leading to the coercion of silence (Manion et al 2019). Whilst there is 
debate about how much choice is constrained in such situations where few regulated 
behaviors were permissible (Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Mannion et al 2019; Weick 
& Sutcliffe 2003); the implication that organizational actors just blindly adhere to 
keeping another’s secrets remains somewhat unconvincing (c.f. Gemmill and Oakley, 
1992).  More pluralistic approaches to leadership (De Rue and Ashford, 2010; 
Tourish, 2014; Uhl-bien and Opsina, 2012) give members or ‘followers’ agency and 
purpose, allowing the leadership to be co-constructed through collective relational 
processes, with members actively deciding whether to be influenced or not (see De 
Rue and Ashford, 2010; Tourish, 2014; Uhl-bien and Opsina, 2012). Here, a leader’s 
influence is positioned as a construct of collective agency; a willingness to defer and 
grant another power, rather than a response to oppression or helplessness (c.f. 
Gemmill and Oakley, 1992; Tourish, 2014).   
Public sector professions are viewed as upholding moral and ethical values 
derived from acting in the interest of the public and gatekeepers in the face of 
bureaucratic pressures (Currie et al, 2019; Gabbioneta et al, 2019; Kouchaki 2014). 
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From this standpoint, professional misconduct is bound in poor performance in the 
public sector. When an organization’s actions infringe the moral conduct of 
professionalism, individuals may feel pressured to deviate from the normative 
standards and ethics of their profession (Muzio et al, 2016).  
Recent streams of literature have viewed silence about misconduct as a 
process, often supported by the same organizational systems and structures that have 
been put in place for the task of right-doing (see Palmer 2013). People engage in, and 
are susceptible to, wrong-doing because the boundaries between right and wrong can 
be narrow and confusing, can subtly shift, and are often influenced by social 
relationships that require the cooperation of others (see Palmer 2013; Muzio et al 
2016). Understanding misconduct as a socially constructed phenomenon is useful to 
capture changes in relation to how individual professionals perform their work; 
changes in institutional arrangements; and professional boundaries (Palmer and 
Maher 2006). These changes can cloud professional judgement, create blind-spots, 
and lead to collective myopia regarding misconduct (Muzio et al., 2016). Behaviours 
can become embedded (through normalisation and socialisation) in professional and 
cultural norms, and in doing so sustain corrupt behaviour; allowing employees to 
retain a wrong course of action through legitimising processes (see Ashforth & Anand 
2003; Balch & Armstrong 2010). Currie et al (2019) propose that further research is 
needed to explore sociological aspects of professional misconduct, for example how 
power differentials between professional groups prevent lower status individuals from 
speaking up. In this paper, we argue that if the leader’s response to failure allows 
misconduct to be silenced and denial to be normalized then the organization will, over 
time, lose its ability to self-correct.  
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Literature examining healthcare scandals has tended to highlight individual 
perpetrators, or ‘bad apples’ (e.g. Harold Shipman, a general practitioner who 
murdered 236 patients; Clifford Ayling, who assaulted 12 women; or Richard Van 
Velzen, who removed children’s organs without consent – see Dixon-Woods et al 
(2011) for an overview. Dixon-Woods et al (2011) argues that scandals of 
professional misconduct have reduced public trust, with a need for enhancement via 
new regulation and formal processes. Hutchison (2016) highlights the role that 
scandals have played in shaping health service reform over the last 75 years, and 
warns that the social construction of scandals by media and public inquiries become a 
political tool to apportion blame. Our case study is not about a few groups of ‘bad 
apples’, or even ‘bad cellars’ but relates to whole ‘bad orchard’ (Mannion et al 2019). 
In considering collective denial as a response to organizational failure over time, we 
need to consider organizational culture. Very few studies have investigated the 
organizational influences on professional misconduct, the only notable exception 
being Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2003) account of wrongdoing at Bristol Royal Infirmary. 
Like other inquiries, this account focused primarily on the role of two surgeons but 
they also explained how groups of clinicians slowly became trapped into a cycle of 
wrongdoing from which they could not disengage.  They argue that the impact of 
intimidating leadership is exacerbated by a process of sharing legitimating behaviors 
(Shephard et al, 2011; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2003), however, issues around silence and 
denial remain relatively unexplored. The failure to examine organizational 
dysfunction and address the prevalence of bullying and incivility (e.g. Carter et al, 
2013) has led Pope (2017:577) to claim that the NHS is ‘institutionally deaf’, with 
widespread learned helplessness, which prevents staff from speaking out. We 
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examine the collective denial of wrongdoing, considering this ‘deafness’ by 
examining the development and maintenance of narratives of silence.  
  
A narrative of silence  
In this paper we refer to ‘narratives of silence’ rather than a culture or climate 
of silence (see Morrison & Milliken 2000; Knoll et al 2016).  The choice of the term 
narrative reflects our view that, unlike culture or climate, only certain aspects of the 
work environment are silenced. Silence is not all-encompassing. Many different types 
of narrative threads or organizational stories may co-exist, each of which influences 
silence, voices and subsequent behaviors in a specific way, by instilling meaning and 
sensemaking (Naslund & Pemer 2012; McDonald et al 2006). The multiplicity of 
narratives within any given situation or organization allow for different accounts to 
emerge (McDonald et al 2006). Narratives can lead to a range of stories and serve as a 
tool for achieving control. One repetitive and dominant message can override all 
others, serving to mirror the ‘truth’ of those in powerful positions (Dailey & 
Browning 2014).  
So, over time certain organizational narratives emerge and become dominant, 
providing a guide about how to think and behave (Dailey and Browning 2014; 
Naslund and Pemer, 2011). As such narratives span out across organizational 
contexts, they reframe established patterns, providing a new path for members to 
follow (Brown et al, 2012). Managers often aid this process by repeating and 
reinforcing the narrative, as a means of controlling behavior and to build confidence 
(Dunn and Eble, 2015; Bies 2009). For example, in our case study staff could, and 
did, safely give voice to issues of good management and successes – it was the 
voicing of concerns around poor care that were flattened.  
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A common message is that any dissent that threatens the publicly shared 
organizational image is not allowed (see Dailey and Browning 2014). Under such 
conditions, alternative messages and courses of action are inhibited. The organization 
can only operate in a direction congruent with the dominant message (Geiger and 
Antonacopoulou, 2009; Naslund and Pemer, 2011). In this way, organizational 
narratives of silence may be functional and purposeful, in being strategically used to 
enhance the organization’s interests by allowing time for self-reflection and 
improvements free from critical gaze (Bies 2009; Van Dyne et al 2003). Yet at some 
point this strategic function may be overridden by more dangerous motives. 
Employees may use silence to signal their willingness to support organizational 
strategies and actions, but their reasons for creating a façade of silence are complex; 
and relate to a myriad of motives and consequences (Schlosser & Zolin 2012).         
Dunn and Eble (2015) argue that corporate discourses from a position of 
power can unfairly marginalize or silence alternative narratives of experience. 
Silence, from this theoretical standpoint can be found in organizations’ narrative 
practices as a contributing factor to sustained failure (see Naslund and Pemer, 2011) 
which we explore in the data below.    
From a micro organizational lens, work on motives for silence and voice (Van 
Dyne et al 2003), and whistleblowing literature, provide understanding about the 
conditions that make it difficult for individuals to speak out. Attempts to personally 
voice concerns are likely to be punished (with termination, a loss of status or working 
conditions), especially if they are perceived by top management as threatening or 
challenging to the organization’s authority (see Miceli et al, 2008). The ability to 
speak against mistakes is additionally constrained by the risk of being ousted or 
isolated in terms of being seen as an untrustworthy ‘backstabber’ or ‘squealer’ 
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(Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005).  What is less well articulated is the 
connection between these positions; how macro level organizational narratives around 
remaining silent intersect with individual risks of retribution and isolation (Schlosser 
& Zolin 2012; Knoll et al 2016).  
Our case of collective denial of failure helps explain this connection, how 
individual behaviors and collective processes intersect, spread and solidify, becoming 
embedded across different organizational practices and contexts. This emergent state 
forms a collective narrative that acts as a reference point for regulating behavior 
(Ashforth and Anand, 2003), with an uncontestable spiral of silence developing where 
no-one speaks out about poor care. 
 
Methods 
Our case study   
The patient was expecting a short stay…she was re-admitted to Stafford Hospital where she 
received very poor care. No one communicated with her or the family and she was left on a 
bedpan for hours without a bowl of water to wash her hands. The family often found traces of 
faeces under her fingernails and on her hands and she was not given a bath or shower whilst 
at the hospital. The patient died shortly afterwards.  
Source: Independent case notes review, Francis (2010: vol 2. p.13).    
 
In the UK, the NHS is a large public-service institution charged with 
providing healthcare. Our study analyzes a single exemplar case of Mid-Staffordshire 
Hospital Trust, a high-profile example of organizational failure. Scandals in the NHS 
are not new (Dixon-woods et al 2011), nor are public inquiries (Mannion et al 2019). 
Our chosen case study is exceptional in not being about the lack of governance 
around a small groups of clinicians (Cannon & Edmonson 2001) or individual ‘bad 
apple’ staff (Dixon-woods et al 2011), but instead encompasses the endemic tolerance 
of poor care across an entire organization (not a bad apple but a bad orchard 
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(Mannion et al 2019)).  Investigations into the Trust revealed widespread appalling 
patient care that effected thousands of patients over a prolonged period (Francis, 
2010). Patients needing pain relief were ignored, others were left unwashed for up to 
a month, food and drink were left out of reach, patient calls for help to use the toilet 
were ignored, with the result that they were left shamed, afraid and soiled (Francis, 
2010). This lack of care continued for several years, despite the presence of external 
quality measures (Coombes, 2013). Since this failure was exposed, many wider 
debates around patient safety, (e.g. Jarman, 2013) organizational culture (e.g. Davies 
& Mannion, 2013; Tingle, 2015) and health leadership (Armit & Oldham, 2015; 
Bruce, 2013) have been triggered. With failure being so exceptional in this case, it 
was important to examine it holistically, with a keen interest on the specific 
circumstances of this organization, at that moment in time, within a wider system. 
Unlike other studies (e.g. Dixon-woods et al, 2011; Hutchison, 2016) which have 
compared multiple instances of wrongdoing by individuals, we focus on one single 
organizational case study where we can examine multiple actor’s behaviour within the 
same context. Here we aim to balance the broad contextual issues from the specific 
context of the case, extracting some general lessons to understand the phenomenon of 
collective denial.  
We began by sourcing data directly from testimony presented in the 2013 
Public Inquiry (Francis, 2013). The inquiry took oral evidence from 164 witnesses 
over 139 days between November 2010 and December 2011, and received 87 witness 
statements and 39 provisional statements. The inquiry focuses on organizational level 
issues to explain how events occurred and provides 1,783 pages of testimony.  
Following this, we systematically searched for accompanying and supporting 
documents that would also provide context and supplement our analysis. There was a 
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report by the Healthcare Commission (HCC) in 2009 (HCC, 2009) into events at the 
Stafford hospital between 2005 and 2009, which showed a catalogue of failings and a 
higher than expected number of deaths. Robert Francis QC launched his first initial 
inquiry in 2010 (Francis, 2010). Both of these reports, and other commentary from 
various professional and regulatory bodies from this time, provide context, and some 
illustrative quotations where helpful.  
Despite the depth of these accounts it is recognised that no single case, 
however detailed, is without limitations. We did not have direct access to 
respondents; even the inquiry staff gathering data were one step removed. We use 
data from witnesses commenting on past events, and retrospectively analysing their 
own actions, who may seek to justify their own positions, and lessen their 
involvement. We acknowledge this as a significant limitation.   
As Brown (2000) and Mannion et al (2019) both point out, public inquiries are 
not neutral representations of truth, but political devices used to give the illusion of 
control by offering acceptable allocations of responsibility and blame. Robert Francis 
QC who led the inquiry, offers 290 proposals (see Coombes, 2013) many of which 
depict an agenda different to ours. In using the Inquiry we accept some voices will be 
more privileged than others (see Brown, 2000), and acknowledge the conclusions 
presented are biased by the choices made. Throughout the research process we 
reviewed reports from other similar cases (including Bristol Royal Infirmary Heart 
Scandal (2001); and The Case of Baby ‘P’ (2008)) in order to check the feasibility of 
our interpretation. We believe that these limitations reflect a worthwhile trade-off 
against the detail offered, allowing us to access the experiences and decision-making 
of those who engaged in controversial actions, which they would be unlikely to 
willingly discuss via any other means.  
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Analysis 
The data analysis was conducted with distinct first-order and second-order phases (see 
Gioia et al, 2012). The first phase involved gaining a familiarity and understanding of 
the inquiry and the context. Following an initial review of the literature, we conducted 
an in-depth reading of the 2010 and 2013 Francis Inquiries, and wrote 364 memos of 
various processes and structures (organizational, interpersonal and intrapersonal). 
Memos were informally written observations about the witness testimonies, offering 
initial reflections on potential relationships and between emotional and attitudinal 
responses exhibited in the informant’s recollection of events.  
The next stage involved an interactive use of reflective notes (summaries of 
our memos and thoughts of what occurred) written down by three researchers and 
discussed in a series of group meetings. For example, we discussed how major actors 
interacted with each other and what this revealed about their agency. We then collated 
earlier memos and reflective notes by exploring individual interpretations and 
dynamic, intertwined movements through an analysis of key themes (see Gioia et al, 
2012).  
Additionally, character profiles of 16 focal actors were developed, to 
contextualize the actions of key individuals, and understand the interconnected 
relationship between individual and collective actions. These included the Chief 
Executive and external institutions such as the Strategic Health Authority. We 
developed an event timeline (see Figure 1) with internal and external events and key 
policy changes and markers of failure which the organization was reacting to (also see 
Francis, 2013 p.49 for a timeline of key warning events).   
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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We see a number of events where failure was apparent, but which failed to 
motivate external stakeholders into corrective action. The lack of reaction to these 
events appears to reinforce the denial of any problems. These activities allowed us to 
develop a picture of what happened at the hospital over time, providing context 
against which we could analyze how poor care escalated and was normalized.  
Up to now the analytic work had been largely a-theoretical and inductive. As 
we entered the second order phase, we purposefully identified codes relating to 
explanations of, and justifications for, instances of events and actions, to which 
broader categories were assigned. We wanted to understand the reactions to the 
various failure events highlighted in the timeline and gain theoretical insight into why 
actors seemed unable or unwilling to prevent the escalation of poor care, and what 
leadership and organizational practices contributed. Drawing on literature and theory 
that explains how wider theoretical categories were formed (Gioia et al, 2012), see 
table 1 below for the final coding outcome, and figure 2 for our final theoretical 
model, developed after further consideration of the results below.     
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
A case of collective denial of failure   
For ease of reading we present our findings in three phases. These phases are not 
neatly bounded by our timeline of external events, but represent how multiple 
organizational processes dynamically unfolded over time.  The first phase outlines the 
contextual conditions that allowed collective denial of failure to arise. The second 
phase, we call the ‘emperor’s new clothes.’ This shows the constitution, confluence 
and maintenance of narratives of silence; around poor care and the need to remain 
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silent about slipping professional standards and misconduct. The final phase covers 
the later stages of the organizations’ implosion.  
The rise  
In considering contextual factors that precluded and triggered events, three strong 
themes emerge: 1) political expectations expressed in performance targets, in 
particular the rhetoric around achieving Foundation Trust (FT) status created an 
imperative need for growth and change. FT status means that a hospital trust has 
satisfied a range of rigorous, financial criteria which allowed for self-governing, with 
less interference from Government; 2) a strengthening of professional and 
organizational identities; and 3) an untested but trusted leadership team.   
The first theme, the need for Foundation status, has been widely discussed as a 
significant factor, with the Inquiry and other analysis supporting this (see Davies and 
Mannion, 2013; McGauran, 2002). In isolation the prioritization of this health policy 
is not especially useful; many other UK hospitals at that time were exposed to the 
same policy and financial pressures. At Mid Staffordshire the desire to achieve 
Foundation status, combined with previous concerns about the organization’s 
performance and management, paved the way for an injection of new (but 
inexperienced) leadership, and a drive for transformation. No-one external to the 
organization was tasked with taking responsibility to ensure that the CEO and his 
team were capable of doing the job. It was assumed externally that the leadership 
could deliver policy priorities whilst maintaining quality and constraining costs. 
I think we trusted that if there was a reasonable action plan, if they say – so long as 
we checked that they had understood, that then we trusted that they would do it. p.77 
(Peer Review Director of the Strategic Health Authority) 
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The inquiry criticizes the hiring of an inexperienced executive team which posed a 
significant risk: 
Each executive was holding office for the first time – this was almost an entirely 
inexperienced team. Responsibility for the fact that many of them were too 
inexperienced must lie with Martin Yeates (the CEO) as he had recruited most of 
them (Managing Director of the governing organization responsible for the hospital at 
this time p.149) 
Despite the leader and his team lacking experience, the CEO appears to have 
had an intimidating approach. Whether this brash confidence was part of the CEO’s 
deeper identity or language he adopted to give the impression of confidence is hard to 
determine, but excessive self-confidence was exhibited. Throughout the inquiry we 
get a picture of an arrogant leader who uses his forceful personality to silence critics, 
but also one who used his persuasiveness to draw in those around him: 
…strong, forceful character’ but could also give the appearance of “being open and 
willing to listen, and very ready to give assurances that concerns would be addressed. 
He was clearly a persuasive individual who convinced experienced and senior health 
service officials of his ability. p.149   
It is the strengthening of relationships between a cast of supporting characters 
that we argue is important for the development of denial throughout the organization; 
including the Board Chair and the Finance Director, but, more notably, the Director of 
Nursing and Medical Director who represent leadership within the medical and 
nursing professions. The unification of these professional and organizational leaders 
is symbolic of the shifting positions which we observe later: 
She had her view and her view was often the only view that could be seen 
as being correct… I know that other people that did try and challenge her 
were quite often sort of berated down and dismissed very quickly (Deputy 
Director of Nursing, describing the Director of Nursing; p160)  
The thrust of the response from the senior management team, including the 
Medical Director at the time…, was that things would be better once [the 
organization] achieved Foundation Trust status. Nobody from senior 
management seemed bothered about what was happening on the floors at 
the time. Everyone was concerned about becoming a Foundation Trust.  
 (Consultant Physician p.201) 
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Together they appeared to overestimate their own capabilities and disregard the views 
of others. This personal capacity to ignore or downplay the seriousness of events 
suggests denial is used as an effective defense against personal culpability and any 
tarnishing of self-image which might result. They created a strong group identity 
which brought them together in pursuit of the same goals. Although two of these 
senior leaders subsequently left the organization, later appointed members of the 
senior management team appeared to quickly conform to the norms of this leadership 
group. One of these new managers  
…described an “endemic culture” of bullying at the Trust…. She felt that all the 
executive team where in “a downward spiral of bullying and the inexperienced 
[CEO, COO and Director of Nursing] was creating a situation of a complete lack of 
leadership. (Senior Manager appointed 2007; p160)  
 
The new Director of Nursing justified her lack of action against professional 
misconduct by citing procedural obstacles that prevented her from speaking out. A 
new Medical Director significantly normalized conditions – believing that they were 
standard across other hospitals, citing inexperience and being overwhelmed as 
justifications for not acting. Regardless, we see how their normalization played a key 
role in preventing any corrective action. 
In summary, the data illustrates how hegemonic power and unity between 
multiple actors at a senior level, including professional role models and leaders, was 
used to launder problems away, with this leader-endorsed narrative proliferated 
throughout, and largely unhindered by external control or resistance from professional 
groups.  
The emperor’s new clothes – escalating narratives of silence 
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In considering how denial of failure can become normalized at a systemic, collective, 
level two key processes emerged; 1) the normalization of poor practice embedded 
throughout the organization, and 2) the silencing of dissenters led staff to become 
actively complicit in the need to maintain an outward facing good impression.  
What we saw at Mid Staffordshire is how poor care standards were 
rationalized as ‘normal’.  
 This happens everywhere and we were just the unlucky ones who got caught… 
“We’re just like any other trust”… (Executive Director of the Board p.182) 
Throughout the inquiry the inadequacy of external regulators in addressing the 
failure is constantly exposed; characterized by an accommodating stance resulting in a 
poor ability to control, monitor and govern. External bodies charged with monitoring 
performance were far removed from front-line care and trusted in governance 
procedures and the reassurances the organization gave. For example, in 2004, 
the Healthcare Commission revised the star rating of the hospital from three to zero, 
following a failure to meet elective surgery targets.  A ‘Stars Recovery Plan’ was 
produced by the organization in response, but this plan was never followed up or 
implemented.  In 2006 and 2007 the Healthcare Commission declared the 
organization was ‘doing OK’, despite poor mortality rates and no physical inspection 
being carried out. In February 2008 the organization was awarded FT status, further 
providing external validation and support for the organizations’ actions. This 
unquestioning attitude is constantly apparent in testimony from external bodies, and 
exacerbated by the hands-off attitude of the board. Concern for preserving and 
managing the external image of the organization, and the external support given, 
helped to normalize the poor standards which were developing, and further reinforce 
that nothing was wrong.  
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In parallel to this normalization process, we see the leadership shifting blame 
or concealing problems in reaction to any criticism. Within the 2010 Francis Inquiry 
there is evidence that the organization dismissed high mortality figures as coding 
errors, despite clear signals otherwise. As noted above, new senior management team 
members were quickly discouraged from ‘rocking the boat’. Collective silence about 
the facts combined with the leadership team’s self-confident attitude made the 
narrative about declining care standards easy to downplay. By preventing discussion 
about issues of poor care, this narrative became silenced.  
Within the organization, professionals were under pressure to protect 
themselves by laundering or concealing problems:   
There was the pressure to massage the figures because if you as the nurse in 
charge in that particular shift had had an excessive amount of breaches, you 
were then held responsible and had to explain it. And I understand that a lot 
of pressure was placed upon sisters in charge, particularly, and they felt 
responsible and sort of were made accountable, which was why they wanted to 
avoid that happening by obviously lying. (Nurse in Accident & Emergency 
p.108) 
 
We observed a shift towards the fulfilment of organization goals and away from 
professional codes of conduct. Here the maintenance of a narrative to remain silent 
about slipping professional standards and misconduct became apparent. This changed 
the meaning of being a ‘good professional’ by degrading the importance of 
professional standards and ignoring the seriousness of what is happening in terms of 
quality of care.  
I think nobody likes to feel that they’re not doing a good job. So that was 
one thing. The second thing is that we had our data analysed…one of the 
other data manipulators in the field, who suggested to us that we did not 
have a mortality problem. And I think that gave us inappropriate and false 
reassurance … So I fully accept that we should have been looking at quality 
of care, but I think we were misled….and, I think, the unwillingness to think 
that we were doing a bad job. (Clinical Governance Lead for the Trust 
p.179) 
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The acts of professional wrongdoing (e.g. nurses not checking on patients 
regularly, ignoring call bells, failing to provide enough pain medication, health and 
safety breaches) (see Francis, 2010) required individual agency. No single instance in 
itself represents the catastrophic failure of care that was eventually uncovered at Mid 
Staffordshire; this comes from the collective and persistent nature of these actions. 
Normally, one might expect that individual instances of this nature would be dealt 
with through disciplinary procedures. In this case, top-down processes of denial were 
cascaded downwards, with individual instances of wrong-doing overlooked which (a) 
contributed to the normalization of these standards and (b) knowing that these actions 
were commonplace made it harder to meter out punishment e.g. ‘we all make 
mistakes from time to time’.  
A common sense of co-complicity was enacted every time a staff member saw 
a breach but said and did nothing. Here silence is compliance, the decision to remain 
silent and not to offer critical feedback is a manifestation of agency; most likely based 
on a justified calculation of self-interest, and constrained choice.   
Not a culture of openness and transparency throughout the [Trust]. Incidences of 
poor care were not formally fed through the system and they were not supplied to 
commissioners or regulators…this degree of silence in the face of catastrophic failing 
of care is unprecedented and remains surprising (Primary Care Trust - Oral 
Submission p.47)  
Witnessing misconduct by others challenged the professional moral compass - 
demands that were likely exacerbated by the projected expectations of wider society. 
Such societal expectations of moral ‘goodness’ mean physicians are strongly 
enculturated against speaking out against each other and their profession, for fear of 
bringing their profession into disrepute (Dixon-Woods et al 2011; McDonald et al 
2006)):      
It’s been a big burden to hold... I must appreciate I am also a doctor and 
in the eyes of the public I’ll always be a doctor, one would hope. But it’s 
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been very difficult. I have been advised…by many different senior 
doctors, healthcare professionals that I need to be careful…we’re all 
conscious of our vulnerability as healthcare professionals. (Junior 
physician p.242)  
Those who tried to give feedback were ignored or punished. Staff quickly found out 
any attempt to intervene or voice concerns was not rewarded, and could lead to 
isolation.   
 …it was a very unusual culture and closed – a closed workforce they didn’t readily 
discuss any issues and it took a significant amount of time to gain trust of the 
workforce (Director of Nursing p.169) 
Strong in-group/out-group dynamics were evident throughout. Staff not buying 
in to the dominant organizational agenda of silence are clearly depicted (within the 
Inquiry evidence) as transgressors. We observed a culture of bullying, whereby 
professionals who were not ‘on board’ with the core organizational narrative around 
ignoring unethical behavior, were threatened with isolation or dismissal. For example, 
it is reported that senior nurses (sisters) in the accident and emergency department 
promoted a culture where people who challenged them were alienated. No one wants 
to be isolated or ousted from their professional group in their place of work, so the 
threat of isolation strengthened compliance (see Palmer 2013; Kreiner et al 2006).   
 [Concerns of malpractice] I did raise this with sisters [X] and [Y], however their 
response was extremely aggressive, basically telling me that they were in charge and 
accusing me and anyone else who agreed with me of not being team players (Staff 
Nurse p.108) 
This uncontestable, and seemingly closed, way of being mirrors the tale of the 
Emperor’s New Clothes (Andersen et al, 1949). In the tale a vain Emperor parades the 
streets pretending he is wearing the finest cloth, which cannot be seen by people who 
are either unfit for office or particularly stupid.  No-one wants to speak out about 
reality (the naked emperor), instead everyone is normalized into pretending that the 
Emperor is clothed - for fear of being thought stupid.  Like the tale, no-one can speak 
out, with a spiral of silence developing, because people feel increasing pressure to 
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conceal their concerns. The denial that anything is wrong or concerning serves to 
create self-doubt about one’s own perceptions. Even if initially evidence of wrong-
doing or poor care seems clear, if no-one else claims to see this, or to be concerned 
then self-doubt about one’s own perceptions will creep in.  So, this silent compliance 
did not just happen, in the data there is agency but it is constrained by self-
preservation, self-doubt and the professional training and socialization in which 
healthcare staff are enculturated (see Spyridonidis et al, 2015). 
Irreversibility  
This final period reveals how collective denial and organizational failure 
become so embedded that internal correction became impossible. Once complicit in 
ignoring poor quality (by this stage it is estimated one thousand patients had 
needlessly died) how do you retract? The individual is vulnerable to exposure, and 
there are group pressures to keep silent and/or perform the same transgression again. 
The reality of working in the NHS is that new scandals constantly emerge, and many 
staff would find little support from their leaders, regulators or even trade unions if 
they chose to speak out (Mannion et al 2019).  
For staff not wishing to risk their own job security and expose themselves to 
abuse or isolation there were few options: (a) to leave (b) to collude, and voice that 
everything was fine, and so become an active part of the denial, or (c) to repress any 
misgivings, and/ or stay silent. Both the inquiry itself (see Francis, 2013, p.66), and 
other corroborating reports (e.g. Frances 2010; HCC 2009) show that in certain areas 
staff turnover at the Trust was extremely high, but rather than sounding warning bells 
this helped to further silence concerns, as staff who were most unhappy were now no 
longer providing a dissenting voice.   
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Some staff did attempt another option, and attempt to speak out and resist the 
collective narrative that all was well. Whether those who chose to resist and speak out 
were ever a significant counter force is unclear from the Inquiry data. What is clearer 
is that resistance was dangerous. There is strong evidence in the Inquiry that those 
staff who spoke up were psychologically isolated and bullied. Poor handling of failure 
and the conflict it arouses can lead to a hostile working environment, in which people 
are ridiculed and bullied (Cannon and Edmonson, 2001; Mannion et al 2019). Over 
time there was an evident spread of bullying and even violence as actors emulated 
leader behavior by becoming coercive and abusive. The atmosphere of fear and 
isolation was pervasive and speaks to an organization where the rules that govern civil 
behavior were ignored.  
In one tragic case a junior nurse committed suicide after an episode of 
bullying. The suicide occurred after she made a complaint, but little or no follow-up 
action was taken (p.1510-11).  Staff appeared to be above the rules, with individuals 
punished for speaking out.  
People saying they know where I live, and basically threats to my physical safety 
(Staff Nurse p.236) 
Investigators received varying reports from staff about [staff behavior] but they 
agreed that feedback when incident reports were filed was rare (Francis concludes 
p.65) 
Whilst, bullying in the pressured environment of healthcare is not uncommon (Carter 
et al, 2013; Pope, 2017) we saw clear disturbing evidence of escalation across all 
levels.  
On arrival at Stafford I found the Emergency Department to be an absolute disaster. Its 
culture was unlike any other I had worked in despite being in the NHS for 25 years. 
There was a culture of bullying and harassment towards staff, especially the nursing 
staff. (Specialist Registrar in emergency medicine p.121) 
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We saw evidence of organizational members becoming emotionally distanced 
from the organization. There is a reluctance to raise concerns because there was no 
mechanism for upward feedback.  
…what we were saying in the meetings would not have made the slightest difference 
to them (Union representative p.206) 
We saw accounts of apathy and powerlessness.  
…the fear factor kept me from speaking out, plus the thought that no-one wanted to 
know (Staff Nurse p.235) 
Together, these examples represent various means of organizational members 
exiting (whether physically, or emotionally). These choices represent the point where 
individuals stopped trying.  
In such stressful situations of failure, a coping strategy for those who 
remain is to repress or shift one’s moral referents (Shephard et al, 2011), with 
staff appearing to further commit to the narrative of silence. Breaches of care 
once thought of as unacceptable became justified. In this self-justification, it 
is not the loss of moral reason, but instead the grounds of reason drift, 
allowing intentional harm to be downplayed.  
They [the staff] didn’t realise how far off acceptable standards things had 
slipped to, and I don’t think that any of them would have let that happen if 
that had happened overnight. I think they would have been up in arms                                     
(Specialist Registrar in emergency medicine on newly arriving at the Trust 
and observing levels patient care p.178)  
Over time, active participation in uncivil or unethical behaviours is more 
widely tolerated. Professionals became encapsulated within a frame of reference and 
way of behaving that would have been unacceptable to outsiders (Balch & Armstrong 
2010). But within the organization, what was seen as professionally acceptable 
became entangled with what was organizationally acceptable: 
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I  regarded myself as a professional who was attempting to understand if 
it was just me that felt that this was an unacceptable state of affairs, and 
whether or not other people were saying “No, actually, this is – this is 
okay and you can do this, this and this, and this will help to change the 
direction. (Junior Physician p.238) 
Decreasing the salience of one’s professional identity allows misconduct to be 
more easily rationalised, decreasing the severity of harm; put simply, people changed 
who they were, so they could more easily normalise what they did (Ashforth & Anand 
2003). Below, the professional in charge of patient safety explains her failure to act 
over an indication of care-quality breach. This suggests professional identification 
was firmly aligned to the organization (and protecting its reputation – viewed as their 
‘responsibilities’) rather than their role as a gatekeeper of professional standards 
(Hutchison, 2016).               
We did have some discussion at this point about whether we should [refer] 
to a professional body [regarding the clinical safety issue]… my 
recollection is we thought about that. You know, what were our 
responsibilities at this time? So, … we could have done more…                                                                                             
(Internal Peer Review Director - investigating a safety breach p.80)  
Staff complicit in misconduct coped by denying and concealing what was 
happening, changing the importance of events and changing who they were 
(weakening their allegiance to their profession and its standards). We see a shift away 
from the traditional codes of conduct and the meaning and importance they held, 
illustrated through the disregard of national benchmarking standards. For physicians, 
their desire to craft themselves in a favourable light meant reinterpreting the rules 
regarding what was good or bad practice. By laundering professional standards, the 
threat to their professional identity was resolved.                 
There’s an abnormal culture which was both within the consultant staff and in other 
staff, whereby it…frequently seemed to me that we had to produce a Stafford version 
of the NICE guidance [the UK national standard of clinical care] as opposed to 
taking it as written by NICE … I think that in retrospect there – there was an 
unwillingness to accept nationally agreed guidance at face value… (Physician p.173)  
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The negative behaviors outlined could be placed on a continuum of ineffective 
to incompetent. Whilst never good, it is difficult to establish wicked intent. At each 
period many staff were driven by a shared desire to create an organization that 
delivered high quality care, but reality became confused. This shared desire pushed 
actors with different interests and identities together; they got onboard and stayed 
onboard. With this drift, the continuum became embedded in the fabric of 
organizational practices, processes and structures. The ramifications were that poor 
standards were now an accepted part of organizational life. The normalization of poor 
care and poor working conditions, and the blindness to misconduct were endemic and 
resistant to any form of self-correction.   
 
Discussion   
In our examination of organizational failure at Mid Staffordshire Trust we 
draw on the idea of narratives of silence. Our contribution is to argue that public 
sector failure can be best understood from a perspective of collective denial.  We 
argue that collective denial has defining characteristics that distinguish it from other 
process, control or domination concepts. Firstly, it is a phenomenon that occurs in 
situations where multiple actors collectively engage and comply to quash dissenting 
voices, thus its appearance and rise cannot be solely attributed to a singular individual 
such as the leader. We move away from the majority of work that extrapolates single 
‘bad apple’ individuals, or small groups to a wider lens. Second, collective denial 
involves cumulative episodes of multilevel, dynamic failure that unfold and escalate 
over time – rather than any singular event or bad decision.  Third, collective denial 
creates a cocoon of systemic and collective unreality; with narratives that serve to 
silence reality and prevent the enormity of failure from being openly discussed, 
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widening the scope for ever more serious failings to occur. In this study we show that 
under certain organizational conditions widespread narrative confluence can create 
collective denial. 
Narratives of silence highlight how unfolding processes and their 
consequences, lead to a sense of unity. Many organizations require staff to become 
allied agents of the collective, committed to working in service of the organizations’ 
strategic goals (see King et al, 2010). Employees are driven to behave in ways that are 
congruent with the organizations’ needs and motivated to enact their work in a 
manner consistent with these needs, rather than their own values (Vadera and Pratt, 
2013).  However, in our case this led to a position where their own moral compass 
shifted (McManus, 2018; Shepherd and Cardon, 2009). Members gave up their own 
mindfulness (see Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Shepherd and Cardon, 2009) and their 
professional identity (McDonald et al 2006) for the good of the organization, perhaps 
finding security in the knowledge that the professional and organizational leadership 
would sanction their behavior (Gabbioneta et al, 2019; Gemmill and Oakley, 1992; 
Balch and Armstrong, 2010).    
As the phenomenon escalates, levels of misconduct and the risk of being 
uncovered heighten, with multiple participants trapped in a set course of action, with 
no possibility of correction.  This means that emerging failure is especially 
problematic and difficult to resolve without intervention from outside.  Narratives of 
silence can be driven by many motivations. It may simply be an act of organizational 
protection at its genesis (Bies, 2009) but over time it can change to a position of 
entrapment (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2003). People become unable to speak out, issues 
become ‘undiscussables’ because now everyone is complicit in poor care or hiding 
misconduct, and the consequences of speaking out are too grave in terms of the 
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organization’s reputation or personal isolation or bullying (Ryan & Oestreich, 1991; 
Van Dyne et al 2003; Milliken et al 2003).  
Under such conditions learning becomes impossible (Schlosser & Zolin, 
2012). Seminal work by Argyris (1977) suggests voice is essential for organizational 
learning. Without voice, the feedback and ‘double loop’ learning, which requires 
questioning, modification and multiple perspectives, will be nullified.  To learn you 
need decision-quality, enhanced by many divergent voices, practices and goals 
(Morrison & Milliken, 2000). The silencing of voice means that early warning signs 
are missed (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2015), organizational reasoning becomes 
fundamentally crystallized, allowing actors to become trapped and ever more serious 
failures to be ignored and justified (Morrrison & Milliken 2000; Schlosser & Zolin 
2012).          
Summarizing these contributions, we present a model of the dynamics of 
collective denial resulting in organizational failure (see figure 2). This process depicts 
how multiple actors engage in a ‘narrative of silence’ and seem unable or unwilling to 
stop the escalation of wrongdoing. This process involves normalization of decisions 
and actions that culminate to take people away from reality.  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
Contextual Conditions for Collective Denial 
The concept of collective denial helps explain why some organizations might 
be more prone to organizational failure by describing key contextual triggers that 
allow collective denial of failure to emerge.  We asked what leadership and 
organizational practices contributed to emergence and maintenance of denial and 
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found that combined impact of assumptions about leadership capability, enculturated 
professional identities and organizational loyalty create an environment where a 
narrative of silence can develop.   
Within the public sector and healthcare in particular, enculturated professional 
identities and organizational loyalties make speaking out against the leader and fellow 
staff difficult (Pope, 2017; Spyridonidis et al, 2015). What is interesting in our case is 
the power of narratives of silence across both clinical and managerial staff. Other 
research has shown that the narratives of these two groups is highly divided (Strong 
and Robinson, 1990; McDonald et al 2006).  This surprising and highly relevant 
merging of narrative confluence, is perhaps, fueled by the recent rise of many hybrid-
clinical staff, who act as both managers and supervisors which means that 
professional boundaries become blurred (Gabbioneta et al, 2019; Spyridonidis et al, 
2015).  
Engagement in the falsehood (that all was well) can be turned into something 
pernicious, as employees can believe that their silence is saving the organization (and 
the good work going on within it) from scrutiny and downfall (Schlosser & Zolin 
2012). Our research, therefore, builds on work which illustrates how strong 
professional codes can provide the raw material that leads to organizational 
misconduct and wider organizational failures (see Vadera and Pratt, 2013). In doing 
so, we highlight how strong professional codes of conduct and ideas of professional 
loyalty, embedded in the identity of professionals, such as physicians, may override 
other salient needs (in our case good care to patients).    
Our research supports the argument that public sector failure is often 
encapsulated by cumulative poor decision-making and consistent under-performance 
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which goes unchecked (Meier and Bohte, 2003; Walshe et al, 2004; Mannion et al 
2019). We observed that any rescue from failure may be difficult where resources are 
stretched or unavailable, making speaking out against decisions more difficult, and 
where external controls are ineffective and time horizons long enough to allow a set 
course of action to solidify. Developing an organization which is mindful and able to 
prevent failures takes considerable time and cost (Weick and Sitcliffe, 2015; Williams 
et al, 2017). The incremental decline of organizational conditions is significant (see 
Schlosser & Zolin 2012). Ryan and Oestreich (1991) illustrate how a cycle of mistrust 
can develop as supervisors and employees engage in self-protective behaviors in 
response to negative assumptions about each other. We observed a similar cyclical 
pattern but represent this as a spiral (downward) in our model, illustrating the ever 
increasing and encapsulating nature of collective denial. Events that slowly unravel 
can catch people out, with staff overlooking minor mistakes which then pave the way 
for a tolerance for more serious breaches (see Ashforth and Anand, 2003). Our 
theoretical model (see figure 2) shows how the processes of developing a narrative of 
silence became irreversible. Collective denial resides within the fabric of the 
organization, making the shared denial more challenging, dangerous and difficult to 
address than simply by changing the leader (see Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Balch 
and Armstrong, 2010). Our data shows how the fate of the leadership and members 
became increasingly enmeshed; almost everyone becomes complicit, with something 
to lose if the new shared reality is threatened. A shared commitment binds people so 
tightly that even those with choice, power and mobility are without voice (Balch and 
Armstrong, 2010; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2003). In our case, violation of the principals 
of quality care, and abusive working conditions, became for many, an accepted part of 
healthcare work (Balch and Armstrong, 2010; Pope, 2017). 
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Practical Implications 
Since writing this paper other healthcare scandals have emerged, suggesting 
that collective denial is not an exceptional occurrence (e.g. Lintern, 2020). The 
context and practices outlined in our case and others in themselves contain nothing 
extraordinary, it is the toxic mix of these factors that creates the devastation that 
ensues, and warrants furthers research.  As discussed, the unique combination of 
policy pressures and professional culture, may mean that healthcare organizations are 
particularly susceptible to this phenomenon. In terms of being able to detect early 
warning signs, and prevent such failures, the picture is complex. Once collective 
denial resides within the fabric of the organization, our data suggest it will be 
dangerous and difficult to address. New staff coming into an organization, although 
more acutely aware of the issues, are unlikely to have the confidence or power to 
speak out. Currently, internal and external governance processes appear limited in 
terms of addressing areas of concern, as they emerge.  
To prevent such future failures our work suggests there needs to be safeguards 
which allow for self-reflection and correction from an early stage.  Here, powerful 
internal cynics, or troubleshooters, who are assigned the task of highlighting areas of 
potential decline, and policy misalignment may be useful.  We also need to reposition 
employees and give them sufficient power to ensure their concerns are acted upon 
with positivity and gratitude (see Tourish 2014 p. 88). We need employees with the 
power and courage to dismantle simplistic ‘success’ paradigms, bringing in diverse 
and challenging worldviews.  How these notions could become embedded within the 
current system is beyond the scope of this paper, but what our paper offers is a 
framework through which possible solutions (which we intend to explore in the 
future) might be evaluated.  
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Table 1 – Data Structure 
 
1st Order Concepts 2nd Order Theme Aggregate 
Dimension 
• Poor previous performance 
• Pressure from above and within – to do better 
Imperative need for 
growth and change 
The Rise 
• Overly concerned with internal approval rather than 
external standards 





• Inexperienced managers unable to question/raise 
concerns 
• Promise of success 
• External trust that leadership team can self regulate 
Unchecked 
confidence 
• Prioritising compliance with external targets 
• Dismissive of difficulties – we are the same as others 





Normalization • External/internal trust in procedures • External validation and support 
• External empathy – it’s a tough job 
External trust and 
support 
• Threat of job security 
• Failure to punish transgressions – staff above the rules 




• Concealment of problems to outsiders – 
miscommunication and gaming the numbers 
• Deny problems (the statistics are wrong) 
• Lack of transparency across all areas 
Obfuscation and 
fabrication of reality 
Silencing 
• Profound loss of voice 
• Fear of being ousted from the in-group 
• Feedback is a betrayal of loyalty 
Culture of 
compliance 
• High staff turnover  
• Exhaustion – no energy to resist 
• Whistleblowers ousted and a staff suicide 
Loss of correcting 
voices 
Irreversibility 
• Increasing powerlessness and passivity of front-line staff 
• Increasing apathy  
• Loss of empathy – indifference to patients 
concerns/suffering 
Emotional distancing 
• Justifying degradation in care 
• Denial of wrongdoing 
• General malaise 
Shift in moral/social 
referents 
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		Red = relevant industry changes 
Black = warning signs 
Blue = failure to detect problems 
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• Imperative need for growth and change 
• Strengthening of professional and 
organizational identities 




• Loss of correcting voices 
• Emotional distancing 








N Obfuscation and fabrication 
of reality 
Culture of 
compliance 
Management 
of external 
image 
(internally) 
External trust 
and support 
Aggressive 
enforcement 
of regime 
Narrative  
of  
Silence 
